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*VNIF*  
*File DCI*  
*Sarna*

16 July 1965

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*Jack*  
*Focus*MEMORANDUM FOR: SUBJECT: Your Duties as my Special Assistant  
for Vietnamese Affairs

1. I have for some time been convinced that a small staff unit should be established, responsible directly to me, which would concern itself with major aspects of the problem of Vietnam and our government's involvement there. As I see them now, they are:

a. all forms of CIA activities carried on in Vietnam, or elsewhere but in relationship to Vietnam, as well as activities and programs concerning Vietnam already in existence at the Headquarters level;

b. the generation of ideas and proposals intended to improve the activities of CIA, specifically, in and concerning Vietnam, and support of the activities and policies of our government, generally, insofar as these activities and policies are related to Vietnam. This latter general category would be primarily for my own consideration and possible use, in discharging my obligations within the intelligence community and directly to the President.

2. I am well aware that there are a considerable number of CIA components, in each of the Directorates, already working full time or part time on various aspects of the Vietnamese problem. I do not wish your work either to duplicate such work as is already under way, nor do I wish that you draw under your control these already-existing components. Rather, you and the members of your

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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
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own permanent staff should establish liaison and utilize these Vietnam-oriented components where they now find themselves. On the other hand, I feel that you should have a small staff of individual specialists in various fields, permanently assigned to your Vietnamese Affairs Staff, who will serve both as your points of contact with CIA or other governmental components, both to keep yourself informed, on my behalf, of the total spread of U.S. activities and programs concerning Vietnam, present or planned, as well as to provide points of input to other components of CIA proposals or recommendations which I have approved. More specifically, I would like you to establish the capability to view the Vietnamese situation in toto and present a comprehensive and integrated picture for total CIA/DCI considerations and actions.

3. In composing your permanent staff, I specifically wish that you have the following specialties represented:

- (1) a. psychological warfare,
- b. counterintelligence and deception,
- c. those military specialties relevant to the nature of the war in Vietnam,
- d. a political and possibly an economic analyst,
- e. an analyst competent in the field of Soviet and Sino political and ideological affairs,



- (2) Establish by name, specific liaison with all pertinent parts of CIA and USIB.

You are authorized to have an executive officer, who shall also be your deputy, and one additional officer, who both should be competent to produce such special reports as your staff may itself originate, or as

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I may require of your staff. As your staff gets under way, a few additional specialties, for which personnel may be required, may identify themselves. Please advise me as this takes place, and I shall decide the extent to which your staff may or may not broaden its area of competences. It is of course assumed that you will acquire sufficient secretarial and clerical assistance for your initial staff, as well as appropriate office space for this group. You may deal directly with DDS in satisfying these needs. In satisfying your needs for specialists, please work these matters out with the Directorates or Offices concerned. Where any specific conflict or difficulty should arise, please take it up with the Executive Director or the DDCL.

4. In summation, I expect your staff to provide me with a focal and coordinating point for all CIA activities concerned with Vietnamese matters. I shall expect you to be familiar with those reports, programs, and proposals regarding Vietnam that are directed to me from within CIA, and to support me with recommendations or derivative proposals as you may see fit. Further, I shall expect you to anticipate problems and questions concerning Vietnam that may be put to me by other elements of the intelligence community or by the President or his advisors and, insofar as possible, keep me at least one step ahead on matters related to Vietnam.

5. In carrying out the duties I have generally outlined in this memorandum, I shall expect that you will not insert yourself in any existing lines of command, but shall carry out the tasks I have assigned you through cooperation and coordination with existing components, both within and without CIA. Given this approach, other CIA components are enjoined to render full assistance to you in carrying out these tasks in my behalf and recipients of this memorandum will publicize it throughout their elements. As may prove necessary, I shall accredit you as my Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to non-CIA elements with whom you must establish contact.

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W. F. RABORN  
Director

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**INTF**

16 July 1965

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W. F. RABORN  
Director**SECRET**

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*File VNTF*

N 50-73

OCI NOTICE  
NO. 50-73

OPERATIONS  
12 July 1965

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

THE VIETNAM SUPPORT GROUP

1. The DCI has directed the formation of a CIA Task Force on the Vietnam situation. In order to insure the most effective OCI effort on this subject and to provide coordinated support to the Agency Task Force a Vietnam Support Group is forthwith established within the Office of Current Intelligence under the immediate direction of

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2. The composition of the OCI Vietnam Support Group is as follows:

Area of Specialization

Name

Extension.

Chief

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Southeast Asia

South Vietnam

Political & Military

Military

Laos, Cambodia, Thailand

China & Asian Satellites

Communist China

Chinese Policy

Chinese Internal

Chinese Military

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declassification

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OCI NOTICE  
NO. 50-73

OPERATIONS  
12 July 1965

Area of Specialization

Name

Extension.

North Vietnam

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Military

Soviet Policy

Sino-Soviet Relations

Acting Director, Current Intelligence

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*no data*  
*July 1965*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Organization of CIA Vietnam Task Force

1. Pursuant to your oral instructions of 30 June and in accordance with the general concept outlined in my memorandum to you of 7 May 1965, subject "Alert Contingency Plans and Standard Operating Procedures," I submit herewith the proposed plan for the organization of the CIA Vietnam Task Force, which supersedes and incorporates the previous CIA Vietnam Working Group.

2. The mission of the CIA Vietnam Task Force will be to provide the Director and the President with staff support on all intelligence aspects of the Vietnam situation, including the three main functions of reporting, analysis and development of action recommendations. The Task Force will execute its mission largely supported by and in coordination with the Vietnam-related elements of the several Directorates.

3. The Task Force will be headed by a Chairman assisted by a staff to include an Executive Officer, an Analysis and Operations Group, and a Technical Advisory Group serving as expert consultants. The CIA Operations Center will render direct support as the Task Force reporting element.

4. Supporting the CIA Vietnam Task Force will be a newly formed OCI Area Force, the Far East Division, DDP, and specialists from the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of Central Reference, the Office of Basic Intelligence, [redacted] and other elements of the four CIA Directorates. All elements of the Agency and the intelligence community will be drawn upon as required.

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PROVISIONAL ROSTER

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Chairman

Executive Officer

Analysis & Operations Group

Operations Officer

Chief, OCI Area Force

Estimates Officer

Southeast Asia Officer

South Vietnam Officer

China/North Vietnam Officer

Economic Officer

Technical Advisory Group

Counterinsurgency Warfare  
Advisor

Aerial Warfare Advisor

Naval Warfare Advisor

Ordnance Advisor

Geographic Advisor

DDS&T Liaison

Historian

Other specialists as required

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25X1 5. Pending completion and staffing of the CIA Operations Center, headquarters of the Task Force will be located in Room 7 F 18. The Chairman's temporary telephone numbers are [redacted] the CIA Operations Center (telephones will continue to be the focal point for spot reporting requirements.

6. A proposed Table of Organization chart is attached.

7. An early requirement for the proper functioning of the new Task Force will be the completion and staffing of the CIA Operations Center. My memorandum of 7 May 1965 cited in paragraph 1 applies.

8. Requests for co-opting of specialist personnel from outside the Agency may be forthcoming when a survey of personnel needs and availability has been completed.

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RAY S. CLINE

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

1. Proposed Table of Organization Chart
2. Provisional Roster

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